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Abstract: I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of 
propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. 
You can know a priori contingent propositions that you rec-
ognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contempo-
rary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, 
which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at 
least to truths that appear necessary. 
1. An Intriguing Possibility 
The possibility of contingent a priori knowledge intrigues philoso-
phers partly because it promises to help solve difficult philosophical 
problems and partly because it is intrinsically fascinating. 
One notorious epistemological problem concerns whether we 
could know that sense perception is reliable.1 Even if sense percep-
tion is reliable, it is not necessarily reliable. It could have been un-
reliable. So we have to gather information to know whether sense 
perception is actually reliable. Gathering such information requires 
us to use sense perception. But using it presupposes its reliability. 
Many think this creates a serious problem.2 Can we really come to 
know that sense perception is reliable by proceeding in a way that 
 
1 Alston 1993 treats the topic extensively. 
2 E.g. Fumerton 1995, Vogel 2000 and Cohen 2002. 
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presupposes its reliability? Arguably this renders our inquiry hope-
lessly circular.3 But then it becomes difficult to see how we ever 
could come to know that sense perception is reliable, and a deep 
and troubling form of skepticism looms. 
The possibility of contingent a priori knowledge exposes a 
weakness in this reasoning. Sense perception could have been unre-
liable, but this doesn’t entail that we must use sense perception to 
learn that it is reliable. We might know this contingent truth a pri-
ori. If I am right, skeptics cannot foreclose this possibility by claim-
ing that a priori knowledge is restricted to necessary truths. 
Aside from promising to help solve stubborn philosophical 
problems, the possibility of contingent a priori knowledge is inter-
esting and important in its own right. It would reveal something 
deep and important about the relationship between mind and world 
if we could, just by thinking hard and without relying on any senso-
ry information about what is happening around us or within our 
own minds, come to know that some contingent claim is actually 
true. (Notice that this differs from innate knowledge of contingent 
truths, should there be any. Innate knowledge does not require even 
thinking hard—the mind simply comes furnished with it.) I find 
such a possibility fascinating, as have many of philosophy’s greatest 
minds. And while some may not share my fascination, hopefully we 
all recognize this topic’s enduring importance in modern philoso-
phy 
Once we establish that such knowledge is possible, we will sure-
 
3 Bergmann 2004 argues that that this type of circularity is not neces-
sarily bad. 
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ly then want to trace its boundaries as best we can. This latter pro-
ject does not occupy me here. My goal is to establish that it is possi-
ble in the first place. 
2. Kripke’s Argument  
Some philosophers express surprise that the standard view is still 
standard. They suppose that several decades ago Saul Kripke 
proved that contingent a priori knowledge is possible. Whereas 
Kant showed that a priori knowledge extends beyond analytic 
truths to encompass some synthetic truths, Kripke showed that it 
extends beyond necessary truths to encompass some contingent 
truths. 
Kripke suggested that you could know a priori that a particular 
stick s is one meter long at a certain time t, despite the fact that it is 
obviously only contingently true that s is one meter long at t.4 You 
could know this a priori if you were, at that very time, using s to fix 
the reference of the term ‘meter’. 
This example fails because it trades on a subtle confusion.5 We 
 
4 Kripke 1980: 56. 
5 The following criticism may resemble Casullo’s 1977: 155 ff, but it is 
actually importantly different. Casullo’s criticism (p. 155 ff.) involves 
distinguishing ‘S is one meter long at t0’ from ‘The length of S at t0 is 
one meter’, and implementing Keith Donellan’s 1966 distinction be-
tween attributive and referential use of definite descriptions. My crit-
icism does not presuppose Donellan’s distinction, and thus is not 
held hostage to developments in the philosophy of language. 
(Note: neither does my criticism presuppose that Donellan’s distinc-
tion is inapt.) Donellan 1977 offers his own criticism of Kripke’s exam-
ples. Also compare BonJour 1998: 12–13, whose criticism of Kripke 
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must distinguish two relevant truths. First, it is true that a stick 
used to fix the reference of a unit of measurement will measure ex-
actly one such unit at the instant the reference is fixed.6 Doubtless 
you can know this a priori; but the truth in question is also neces-
sary. Second, it is true that s is one meter long at t. Doubtless this 
truth is contingent; but it is not something you could know a priori. 
The appearance of contingent a priori knowledge is generated only 
if we fail to distinguish these two salient truths, mistakenly running 
together the apriority of the first and the contingency of the sec-
ond. You could of course know that s is one meter long at time t, by 
virtue of knowing (a) that any stick used to fix the reference of a 
unit of measurement will measure exactly one such unit at the in-
stant the reference is fixed, and (b) that s is being used at t to fix the 
reference of ‘meter’. But knowledge of (b) depends essentially on 
sense experience, so it is obviously not a priori. Consequently the 
knowledge that s is one meter long at t is not a priori either. 
Kripke’s example never persuaded me, for the reason just given. 
Those who are persuaded by Kripke’s example will find in my ar-
gument further, independent evidence for the possibility of contin-
 
both essentially resembles mine and predates it by several years. 
6 Actually this is not quite true, for one might fix the referent of ‘schme-
ter’ by saying, ‘Let “schmeter” designate that length equivalent to 
one-tenth the present length of this stick’ while holding up a stick. 
The stick in this example would have been used to fix the reference 
of ‘schmeter’, yet would not thereby measure one schmeter, but ra-
ther exactly ten. We could get around this problem by stipulating 
that we are concerned with only standard reference-fixing rituals, 
wherein a unit of measurement is fixed as equal to the entire length 
of an object. For ease of exposition, I ignore these details in the text. 
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gent a priori knowledge. 
 
*** 
The remainder of this paper divides into three sections. First I pre-
sent a version of the standard view (BonJour’s). Then I present my 
argument. The argument demonstrates how my alternative view 
emerges from some very plausible claims about knowledge. Finally 
I respond to several objections. Along the way we’ll see how another 
important challenge to the standard view, suggested by John Haw-
thorne and even considered by BonJour, fails. 
Before proceeding, let me briefly address an issue that may be 
on some readers’ minds. In addition to restricting a priori 
knowledge to necessary truths, many proponents of the standard 
view also say that a priori justification is infallible and rationally 
unrevisable (by experience, at least). These claims are implausible, 
as several theorists have persuasively argued.7 I won’t rehearse their 
arguments, but the following line of reasoning persuades me. Other 
things being equal we ought to prefer a more unified treatment of a 
priori and empirical justification. So since empirical justification is 
neither infallible nor rationally unrevisable, other things being 
equal we ought to prefer a theory of a priori justification that says it 
is likewise neither infallible nor rationally unrevisable. 
Moreover establishing the possibility of contingent a priori 
knowledge will provide further evidence that fallible and rationally 
revisable a priori justification is possible. If you can be a priori justi-
 
7 See Jeshion 2000, BonJour 1998: Ch. 4.4, BonJour 2001, Plantinga 
1993: 110–113, and Casullo1988. 
 6 
fied in believing something that is possibly false, then you might be 
a priori justified in believing something that actually is false. And if 
you might be a priori justified in believing something that actually 
is false, then of course you might later discover evidence that what 
you believe is false, whereupon you would no longer be (as) justified 
in believing it, and so might rightly revise your opinion. 
3. The Standard View, BonJour Style8 
On BonJour’s view, you a priori know that Q only if you are a priori 
justified in believing Q. Justification is the source of apriority. So 
 
8 Representing the standard contemporary view: Chisholm 1977: 46 
tells us, “whatever is a priori is necessarily true.” According to 
Chisholm 1977: 43, S knows p a priori only if p is axiomatic for S; p is 
axiomatic for S only if p is an axiom; and p is an axiom only if it is 
necessarily true. BonJour 1998: 107 tells us that the a priori concerns 
“the way that reality must be.” Plantinga 1993: 106 tells us, “all of 
what we know a priori is necessarily true.” Bealer 1999: 30 tells us that 
we can have a priori knowledge of p only if it “presents itself as nec-
essary.” Huemer 2007: 37 says, “I am inclined to agree that all ap-
parent rational insights seem necessary,” but compare p. 43. 
 Representing the traditional view: Kant 1996: 44 tells us that “a 
priori cognitions” are “universal cognitions . . . characterized by in-
trinsic necessity.” Hume 1993: section IV tells us that propositions 
knowable a priori (or, as Hume puts it, knowable “by the mere oper-
ation of thought, without dependence on what is any where exist-
ent in the universe”) are such that their denial “implies a contradic-
tion,” which of course indicates that truths known a priori are neces-
sary. Leibniz 1973: 98 takes a slightly more nuanced view, though the 
difference matters not for human knowledge. He tells us that, for all 
cognizers except God, truths knowable a priori are necessary: “exis-
tential or contingent propositions differ entirely from [necessary 
propositions]. Their truth is understood a priori by the infinite mind 
alone.” 
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let’s examine BonJour’s theory of a priori justification.9 
You are justified in believing Q just in case you have a reason10 
that makes it sufficiently likely that the belief is true. (‘Sufficiently’ 
will be left vague.) You are a priori justified in believing Q just in 
case you are justified in believing Q and your reason for believing Q 
does not depend on any positive appeal to experience of contingent 
features of the actual world, but rather depends upon “pure thought 
alone.”11 BonJour writes, 
the relevant notion of experience should be under-
stood to include any sort of process that is perceptual 
in the broad sense of (a) being a causally conditioned 
response to particular features of the world and (b) 
yielding doxastic states that have as their content pu-
tative information concerning such particular, contin-
gent features of the actual world as contrasted with 
other possible worlds.12 
Put simply, your belief that Q is a priori justified just in case it is 
justified and based solely on intuition.13 Any experience required 
 
9 BonJour 1998: Chapters 1 and 4, esp. pp. 8–11, 100–13. 
10 Some might prefer ‘evidence’ to ‘reason’. It matters not for present 
purposes which we choose. 
11 BonJour 1998: 7. BonJour (1998: 114) also places procedural condi-
tions on the manner in which one considers the proposition, e.g., 
with care, and with due consideration to the fact that it appears 
necessary. I ignore these for present purposes. 
12 BonJour 1998: 8. 
13 Here I overlook an important distinction between propositional and 
doxastic justification, which may be safely ignored for present pur-
poses. I also overlook one other important matter. BonJour’s ultimate 
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to acquire the concepts needed to understand Q doesn’t undermine 
the apriority of justification. 
A proposition apt to be intuited is “rationally self-evident,” 
which means that “its very content provides, for one who grasps it 
properly, an immediate accessible reason for thinking that it is 
true.”14 Simple arithmetical, logical, and conceptual truths are the 
clearest examples of self-evident propositions: that 2 + 2 = 4, that 
<Q & (Q only if P)> entails <P>, that scarlet is not a shade of blue, 
etc. 
Note two crucial features of this view. First, BonJour’s admira-
ble explanation of the concept of a priori justification does not state 
or even suggest that the proposition in question must be, or seem to 
be, necessarily true. This is evident from my presentation in this 
 
official characterization of intuition (or as he sometimes refers to it, 
“rational insight” or “a priori insight”) builds in reference to the ap-
parent necessity of the intuited proposition. Intuitions provide “direct 
or immediate insight into the truth, indeed the necessary truth, of the 
relevant claim . . . . They are thus putative insights into the essential 
nature of things or situations of the relevant kind, into the way that 
reality in the respect in question must be.” See BonJour 2005: 99. But 
notice that BonJour can adequately articulate the concept of a 
priori justification without mentioning necessity. Moreover, from the 
present perspective it would simply beg the question to insist on the 
apparent necessity. 
 One final caveat. BonJour often uses a mere ‘if’ when charac-
terizing the nature of a priori justification. If he genuinely intends to 
establish only a sufficient condition—i.e. if there are other ways to 
achieve a priori justification—then insisting on apparent necessity 
would not beg the question. However, as the proposed analysis 
quoted just below in the main text indicates, BonJour intends to pro-
vide jointly sufficient and necessary conditions. So I do not think he 
can properly insist upon the condition in question, at least in the pre-
sent context. 
14 BonJour 1998: 102. 
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section up till now. As further evidence, consider also these passag-
es from early in BonJour’s seminal book on the topic: 
Historically, most epistemologists have distinguished 
two main sources from which the epistemic justifica-
tion of a belief might arise. It has seemed obvious to 
all but a very few that many beliefs are justified by ap-
peal to one’s sensory (and introspective) experience of 
the world. But it has seemed equally obvious to most 
that there are other beliefs, including many of the 
most important ones that we have, that are justified in 
a way that does not depend at all on such an appeal to 
experience, justified, as it is usually put, by reason or 
pure thought alone. Beliefs justified entirely in the lat-
ter way are said to be justified a priori, while beliefs 
justified at least partially in the former way are said to 
be justified empirically or a posteriori.15 
In summation, I propose to count a proposition p as 
being justified a priori (for a particular person, at a 
particular time) if and only if that person has a reason 
for thinking p to be true that does not depend on any 
positive appeal to experience or other causally medi-
ated, quasi-perceptual contact with contingent fea-
tures of the world, but only on pure thought or reason, 
even if the person’s ability to understand p . . . derives, 
 
15 BonJour 1998: 2. 
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in whole or in part, from experience.16 
These passages do not specify the modal status of the proposition in 
question.17  
Second, the definition of self-evidence does not restrict self-
evident propositions to necessary truths. Its content need only pro-
vide a reason for thinking that it is true, and clearly one can have a 
reason for thinking that a claim is true without also having a reason 
for thinking that it is necessarily true.18 
These two points merit special emphasis. They indicate that we 
should not be the least bit surprised if some contingent proposi-
tions turn out to be viable candidates for a priori knowledge. Noth-
ing in the intuitive conception of a priori justification suggests oth-
erwise. 
BonJour is often treated as representative of the standard 
view,19 as I have treated him here. But I should note that at one 
point he says something suggesting that he might accept a priori 
justification for some contingent truths.20 Yet this comes only very 
 
16 BonJour 1998: 11. 
17 Of course, one might argue that the formulations imply that the 
proposition appears to be possibly true. The important point is that 
they imply neither that the proposition is nor appears to be both pos-
sibly and necessarily true. (All necessarily true propositions are possi-
bly true, but not vice versa.) They do leave open the possibility that 
the proposition is, and appears, both possibly true and possibly false. 
18 Compare Audi 1999: 211–212. 
19 E.g. Casullo 2002: 101, 104. Unlike other proponents of the standard 
view, BonJour doesn’t think a priori justification must be infallible and 
rationally unrevisable. 
20 BonJour 1998: 208–209. It isn’t exactly clear which proposition he 
thinks is a priori justified: that it is highly probable that in the actual 
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late in BonJour’s discussion, is subject to interpretive difficulty, and 
contradicts what he says elsewhere in the chapters and articles ded-
icated to explaining and defending his view. He says, “a priori justi-
fication occurs when the mind directly or intuitively sees or grasps 
or apprehends a necessary fact about the nature or structure of real-
ity.”21 Perhaps most pointedly, he says that a suitable intuition 
“must involve a genuine awareness by the person in question of the 
necessity or apparent necessity of the proposition in something like 
the strong logical or metaphysical sense.”22 We will return to this 
issue below. 
4. My Argument  
Here is my argument: 
1. If you have a non-accidentally justified true belief that Q, 
then you know that Q. (Premise) 
2. If you know that Q and your justification for believing Q 
is a priori, then you a priori know that Q. (Premise)23 
 
world there is a non-chance explanation for the truth of a standard 
inductive premise, or, that there actually is a non-chance explana-
tion for the truth of a standard inductive premise. (A standard induc-
tive premise states that m/n observed As are Bs.) If the former, then 
BonJour has not conceded that there could be a priori justification 
for contingent truths, because he says the truth in question is neces-
sary. If the latter, then BonJour has conceded the point. But as I will 
explain below, even if BonJour is genuinely conceding the point, the 
example he uses arguably shouldn’t convince us that his concession 
is advisable. 
21 BonJour 1998: 15 - 16. 
22 BonJour 1998: 114. See also BonJour 2005. 
23 Present purposes require only a sufficient condition. If you want a 
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3. Therefore if you have a non-accidentally justified true be-
lief that Q and your justification is a priori, then you a 
priori know that Q. (From 1, 2) 
4. If your justified belief that Q is based solely on an intui-
tion that Q, then your justification is a priori. (Premise) 
5. It is possible for you to be non-accidentally justified in 
believing some contingent proposition solely on the basis 
of an intuition. (Premise) 
6. Therefore it is possible for you to have contingent a priori 
knowledge. (From 3–5) 
Line 2 is a straightforward and intuitive sufficient condition for 
a priori knowledge, which my opponents and I can share. Line 4 
merely states a sufficient condition for a priori justification, and is 
assumed in much of the literature. Again my opponents and I can 
both accept line 4. (Please note that since line 4 merely states a suf-
ficient condition for a priori justification, it doesn’t assume that all a 
priori justification derives from intuition or self-evidence.) 
Before looking more closely at lines 1 and 5, let me caution 
against a potential error. I have been asked whether line 5 alone 
constitutes a repudiation of the standard view, and hence whether 
the rest of the argument is superfluous. Short answer: no. A mo-
 
definition, then I propose: You a priori know that Q =def You know 
that Q and your justification for believing Q is a priori. (We’ll need to 
add a wrinkle to handle cases of epistemic overdetermination, 
along with a specification of how the belief is based, which I leave 
to your ingenuity.) Compare Kitcher’s 1980: 9–10 analysis. Kitcher 
speaks of warrant, whereas I speak of justification. In Casullo’s (2002: 
Section 2) terminology, mine is a reductive and purely epistemic 
analysis of a priori knowledge. 
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ment’s reflection reveals that line 5 by itself does not generate a 
conflict with the traditional view. To do that, we must supplement it 
with further assumptions regarding knowledge. The argument pro-
vides this. 
Regarding line 1, some epistemologists might argue that non-
accidentally justified true belief is sufficient and necessary for 
knowledge.24 They might be correct, but my purposes require only 
sufficiency. 
I will not offer an exhaustive account of the difference between 
epistemically relevant and irrelevant luck (accidentality).25 But I 
must say enough so that we can all agree that the protagonist in my 
example below does not suffer from the epistemically relevant vari-
ety, which I will do now.26 
Some accidents are epistemically relevant, but many are not. 
We usually distinguish them effortlessly. For example, Sid believes 
that one of pockets is torn because he happened to glance in the 
mirror at just the right angle. Otherwise he wouldn’t have had the 
visual evidence that his pocket is torn. There is obviously something 
accidental about Sid’s coming to have the visual evidence that he 
does. It needn’t have turned out that Sid glanced in the mirror when 
he did, at the angle he did. The same can be said for the justification 
 
24 Compare Unger 1968. Unger gives a full-blown analysis. But he 
leaves out justification, speaking instead of it not being an accident 
that the subject gets things right. 
25 For an extensive discussion, see Pritchard 2005: Part II. For a promis-
ing solution to the problem of epistemic, as well as moral, luck, see 
Greco 2006. 
26 Section 5 addresses residual worries about probabilistic grounds, 
which are closely related to epistemic luck. 
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for nearly every empirical belief.27 But the mere fact that Sid needn’t 
have had the experience doesn’t spoil his knowledge. Otherwise on-
ly necessary experiences—whatever that is supposed to mean—
could ground knowledge. 
The original Gettier cases and Carl Ginet’s barn-façade case 
provide examples of epistemically relevant accidents.28 We focus 
here on Ginet’s barn-façade case because it involves a non-
inferential belief. This puts us in a position to see that pernicious 
epistemic luck of this sort does not afflict the protagonist in my ex-
ample below, forestalling a potential objection to my defense of line 
5. 
Here is Ginet’s case. Henry is driving through the countryside. 
At a certain point, a roadside barn catches his attention. Optimal 
viewing conditions obtain. On the basis of the barn-look, he forms 
the justified true belief that there is a barn along the roadside. But 
Henry is in Fake Barn Country, where numerous barn façades pop-
ulate the land. There are many, many façades but only a handful of 
 
27 It is controversial whether cogito beliefs (e.g., the belief you would 
express by uttering ‘I exist’, or the one you would express by uttering 
‘I am thinking’) count as empirical. Even if they are, there still is 
something accidental about your having evidence for them—after 
all, you might not have been thinking at the moment—indeed, you 
might not even have existed. We could argue about these special 
cases, but the outcome won’t adversely affect the discussion in the 
main text, precisely because these special exceptions prove the rule 
regarding “the justification for nearly every empirical belief.” 
28 Gettier 1963. We learn of Ginet’s barn-façade case through Gold-
man 1976: 772 ff. I myself think Ginet’s case differs crucially from Get-
tier’s, but I’ll bypass that controversial point here. For an argument 
that the subject in Ginet’s example does know that there is a road-
side barn, see Turri forthcoming. See also Lycan 2006 and Sosa 2007. 
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real barns in the area. If a façade had caught Henry’s attention, he 
would have falsely believed it was a roadside barn. 
Many philosophers intuit that Henry doesn’t know that there is 
a barn along the roadside. What explains the intuition? One plausi-
ble explanation is that the connection is extremely tenuous between 
Henry’s reason (the barn-look) and his belief’s truth. In Fake Barn 
Country the barn-look does not make it likely that Henry is looking 
at a barn. 
The right example should convince us of 5. John Hawthorne 
provides examples that he thinks suffice.29 His example of The Ex-
plainer is the most plausible, so we’ll focus on it. 
The Explainer is a disembodied being who, prior to having any 
sensory experience, engages in a priori reflection about which mi-
crophysical theories would best explain various possible “experien-
tial life histories.” For one of the possible life histories, L, The Ex-
plainer comes to justifiedly believe that theory T would best explain 
it. The Explainer’s belief that T best explains L, Hawthorne sug-
gests, is a priori justified because he forms it just by thinking hard, 
uninformed by sensory experience. Let’s grant that The Explainer 
can know a priori that T best explains L. The Explainer then con-
templates his impending embodiment. Based on his a priori 
knowledge that T best explains L, he infers the material conditional 
‘If I undergo experiential life history L, then T is true’. If true, this 
conditional will be only contingently true, because it is possible for 
the best explanation to be false. Hawthorne judges it plausible that 
 
29 Hawthorne 2002.  
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if the conditional turns out to be true, then The Explainer knows 
that it is.  
We might object on the grounds that we lack good reason to be-
lieve that the best explanation is more likely true than not. Take the 
set of possible worlds where L occurs (the ‘L-worlds’). Suppose T 
explains L at a plurality of them (call these ‘T»L-worlds’). This 
makes T the most likely and so best explanation of L. But T»L is still 
unlikely given L (in the same sense of likelihood). A plurality of L-
worlds are T»L-worlds, but most L-worlds are not T»L-
worlds. (It might even turn out that most L-worlds are not T-
worlds.30) Knowledge clearly requires a stronger truth-connection 
than this, or so you might reasonably maintain. 
Similar reasoning suggests that The Explainer’s belief is not 
non-accidentally justified. The truth connection here is just too ten-
uous. Most L-worlds are not T»L-worlds, even though The Explain-
er’s world happens to be a T»L-world. This is relevantly similar to 
inhabiting an area where most things that look like barns are not 
barns, yet you happen to be looking at the one barn in the entire 
county.31 
 
30 Call a world where T and L are both true a ‘T&L-world’. The T»L-
worlds form a proper subset of the T&L-worlds. Not all T&L-worlds are 
T»L-worlds. Consider an analogy. Divine command ethicists say that 
God’s commanding us to not steal (T) explains why stealing is wrong 
(L). But divine command ethics could be false (not T»L) even though 
stealing is wrong and God does command us to not steal (T&L). You 
can consistently maintain that stealing is wrong, that God com-
mands us to not steal, and that stealing’s wrongness is explained by 
its bad consequences, not by God’s commands. 
31 Many externalists might reject this reasoning. Suppose that even 
though most L-worlds are not T»L-worlds, the actual world and all 
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Properly addressing these concerns requires providing a suita-
ble account of explanation, and what it is for a hypothesis to best 
explain some data—a monumental undertaking, to say the least. 
I have a further concern about the example. Many parties to the 
debate care about the possibility of human contingent a priori 
knowledge. Hawthorne’s bizarre case is irrelevant to this. Leibniz 
conceded that God had a priori knowledge of contingent truths. 
Others might well concede the possibility of superhuman or divine 
contingent a priori knowledge, yet deny it is humanly possible. 
Even granting everything Hawthorne says about The Explainer, this 
issue remains unsettled. (My example below establishes that it is 
humanly possible.) 
BonJour at one point makes a suggestion similar to Haw-
thorne’s. The example forms part of BonJour’s ambitious attempt to 
solve the problem of induction by explaining how we could be a pri-
ori justified in accepting the following principle: 
If m/n of observed cases of A have been cases of B, 
given suitable variation of the collateral circumstances 
and the absence of any further relevant information, 
then it is likely or probable that, within some reason-
able measure of approximation, m/n of all cases of A 
 
nearby worlds are T»L-worlds. Thus not easily would T fail to explain L. 
This might suffice for knowledge on many externalist views. Internal-
ists, such as BonJour or Chisholm, would of course object. To the 
greatest extent possible, I aim to bypass the internalist/externalist 
controversy here, so I want to avoid relying on assumptions or ex-
amples that only externalists would accept. In any event, examples 
much simpler than Hawthorne’s would suffice from an externalist 
perspective. 
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are cases of B.32 
The intuitive thought behind this suggestion, BonJour explains, “is 
that an objective regularity of a sort that would make the conclusion 
of a standard inductive argument true provides the best explana-
tion for the truth of the premise of such an argument.”33 
But we have already seen a potential problem with this. If we 
suppose, along with BonJour and most other epistemologists, that a 
good epistemic reason for believing Q must at least make Q more 
likely than not, then we shouldn’t conclude that the mere fact that a 
hypothesis best explains the data constitutes a good epistemic rea-
son for believing the hypothesis. Accordingly we shouldn’t accept 
that it could, by itself, provide a priori justification or knowledge. 
So a proponent of the standard view will likely mistrust exam-
ples featuring explanatory reasoning. Fortunately we needn’t rely 
on such examples to validate 5. Consider this most unlikely case: 
(MOST UNLIKELY): Sam considers whether the 
most unlikely possible event is not presently occur-
ring. By ‘the most unlikely possible event’, Sam in-
tends to designate whatever was, at the immediately 
preceding instant, t - 1, the possible event most un-
likely to occur at the next instant, t, which is the mo-
 
32 BonJour 1998: 206. 
33 BonJour 1998: 207. BonJour emphasizes ‘explanation’ but not ‘best’. 
I suspect this is a mere typographical error (if it weren’t the best, 
then why would it matter?). In any event, the italics for ‘best’ are 
mine. 
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ment at which her deliberation occurs.34 Sam under-
stands the proposition in question. Solely in virtue of 
that understanding, it seems to her — i.e. she intuits 
— that the proposition is true, though not necessarily 
so. On the basis of this intuition, she believes that the 
most unlikely possible event is not presently occur-
ring. Her belief is true. 
Note that Sam does not reason her way to the belief that the most 
unlikely possible event is not occurring. Her belief is non-
inferential, based on the intuition, not other beliefs. 
The example features a proposition that is overwhelmingly like-
ly to be true as a matter of conceptual necessity. This crucial fea-
ture makes it relevantly similar to standard examples of a priori 
knowledge of necessary truths. It explains why Sam can be non-
accidentally justified in believing that it is not occurring, just by 
considering it and without relying on sensory or introspective expe-
rience. 
It is doubtful that sensory or introspective experience even 
could bolster Sam’s justification here. What sort of experience could 
be relevant? Experience could not provide any evidence for thinking 
that the event is somehow more unlikely to occur. Sam already un-
derstands it to be the most unlikely possible event. Granted experi-
ence can give us evidence that certain events are impossible. For 
example experience informs us that Hesperus and Phosphorus are 
 
34 Perhaps this is best described in terms of an event type. But I’ll ignore 
this because it doesn’t seem to affect the basic line of thought. 
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one and the same heavenly body, from which we infer that Hesper-
us could not possibly collide with Phosphorus. But experience can-
not do this in the present case because you could never acquire any 
evidence, experiential or otherwise, for thinking that the the most 
unlikely possible event (when picked out under that very descrip-
tion) is impossible. 
The present case does not relevantly resemble Gettier or Ginet 
cases. Sam inhabits a perfectly ordinary environment, leisurely re-
flecting on matters of personal interest. (For any extension or modi-
fication you might conceivably propose that would turn it into a 
Gettier or Ginet case, I will explicitly enter the proposal’s negation 
into the case’s description.) Whereas we could rig an environment 
so that the barn-look is a counter-indication of real barns, it is im-
possible to rig an environment so that an event’s being the most un-
likely possible event is a counter-indication of its not occurring.35 
Before turning to objections, let me clarify one point. It could 
turn out that if Sam were to pick out the event satisfying the de-
scription ‘the most unlikely possible event’ under some other de-
scription, then she wouldn’t be a priori justified in believing that it 
is not occurring. Suppose that the most unlikely possible event is 
for the most massive object in the universe to quantum tunnel. 
Such an event is improbable to an unfathomable degree. But to be 
justified in believing that it is not occurring, you would have to 
know something about the actual physical laws and how massive 
the most massive object is. Had the physical laws been different, the 
 
35 I imagine one objection to this, which I consider below. A minor ad-
justment completely avoids any worries. 
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most massive object might have been quite likely to quantum tun-
nel at any moment. Likewise, even holding the actual physical laws 
constant, if the most massive object was a quark, it would not be 
very unlikely for it to quantum tunnel. We need experience and ob-
servation to learn such things.36 
5. Objections Answered  
One might object that there is no such thing as the most unlikely 
possible event. For any contingent event of probability n, there is 
always another possible event of probability n - m (where 0 < m < n 
< 1). Take any compossible contingent events e and e', and the event 
that is their co-occurrence, e''. The probability of e'' will be less than 
that of either e or e'. Since there are indefinitely many compossible 
events, there will be no end to the process. Thus there will never be 
a possible event than which no other event is more unlikely. I meet 
this objection by stipulating that Sam is concerned with non-
conjunctive or atomic events, such as e and e'. 
Another objection is that it might turn out that there is, as a 
contingent matter of fact, no most unlikely possible event. This is a 
problem of uniqueness. There might be two or more events that 
share the title ‘event than which no other event is more unlikely’, 
 
36 You might disagree, claiming that we can indeed know such things 
without the aid of sensory experience, but only when entertained 
under a certain sense. Perhaps I have just described such a case. 
Granting this would not hinder my cause, so I will let it pass without 
further remark. In any event, a responsible treatment of the nature of 
belief and its objects falls beyond this paper’s scope. 
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but none that is the most unlikely. And we cannot plausibly adjust 
the example so that Sam believes no event, than which no other 
event is more unlikely, is occurring. For if there are enough events 
satisfying this description, it might be very likely that at least one 
such event is occurring. And it is not plausible that Sam could be a 
priori justified in believing that only a relatively few events satisfy 
that description. I meet this objection by adjusting the example 
through conditionalizing Sam’s belief. And by that I mean she be-
lieves: IF there is a unique most unlikely possible event, THEN it is 
not occurring. This material conditional will be true just in case ei-
ther (a) there is no such unique event, or (b) there is but it is not oc-
curring. Either way, it is only contingently true. Sam could be non-
accidentally justified in believing this conditional simply in virtue of 
understanding it. 
A further objection questions whether the most unlikely possi-
ble event must be unlikely. Recall that ‘the most unlikely possible 
event’ designates whatever was, at the instant immediately preced-
ing, t - 1, the possible event most unlikely to occur at the next in-
stant. Suppose for the sake of argument that at t – 1 the entire fu-
ture state of the world at t was determined, except for whether a 
single electron will veer left or right at a certain juncture. Suppose 
further that the likelihood of its veering left is .49 and of its veering 
right .51. Now the electron’s veering left is the most unlikely possi-
ble event. But an event whose probability of occurring is .49 is not 
unlikely. (It’s not likely either, but that’s beside the point.) So Sam’s 
belief is at best only accidentally justified. In response we can simp-
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ly modify the example. Let Sam believe that if there is a unique 
most unlikely possible event whose probability of occurring is at 
most one in a quintillion, then that event is not presently occurring. 
Some will object to the case on the following grounds. 
Knowledge is the norm of assertion. So if it is out of line for Sam to 
assert the proposition in question, then Sam does not know that 
proposition. And it would be out of line for Sam to assert that prop-
osition. Therefore Sam does not know. 
My response is twofold. First, we must specify the content of 
the knowledge account of assertion (KA). The argument is invalid if 
we take Timothy Williamson’s official formulation, “one must: as-
sert p only if one knows p,”37 which states only a necessary condi-
tion. There could be other necessary conditions for appropriate as-
sertion that one fails to meet. And this is no artifact of Williamson’s 
formulation: KA incorporates only a necessary condition as stand-
ardly formulated.38 Perhaps my opponent would be willing to up-
grade the necessary condition into a biconditional, and then run the 
argument.39 That would make the argument valid, but still not 
sound. 
This brings me to my second response. Sam would not be out of 
line to assert the proposition in question. So long as it does not turn 
out that the most unlikely possible event was then occurring — as is 
stipulated in the case — we have no grounds for reproaching her. 
 
37 Williamson 2000: 243. 
38 E.g. Weiner 2005 states the essence of the view as follows: “we 
should assert only what we know.” 
39 DeRose 2002: 180 says, “one is well-enough positioned to assert that 
P iff one knows that P.” 
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Some philosophers will disagree, notably V.H. Dudman.40 Dudman 
contends, “what is needed for assertibility” is the “absence of possi-
bility to the contrary.” Anything short of that and “assertibility goes 
out of the window.”41 But the present case is a devastating counter-
example to that thesis. If asked whether the most unlikely possible 
event is occurring, Sam needn’t hedge and assert that it is almost 
certainly not occurring. She may assert that the most unlikely event 
is not presently occurring. The flat-out assertion is entirely appro-
priate.42 If Dudman reproached Sam, “Pardon me, Miss, but you of 
course meant that it is almost certainly not occurring,” she could 
rightly respond, “Oh, come on! It’s not occurring, and we all know 
it.” 
A related objection focuses on the statistical or probabilistic na-
ture of Sam’s grounds for judgment. Some might argue that mani-
festly statistical grounds cannot suffice for knowledge.43 They might 
offer this as an explanation for why you cannot know that you will 
lose (or have lost) a fair lottery, when all you have to go on is the 
long odds. If they are right, then one would suspect that the mani-
festly statistical nature of Sam’s grounds prevent her from knowing 
that the most unlikely possible event will not occur. 
 
40 Dudman 1992. 
41 Dudman 1992. See also Williamson 2000: 246 – 7. 
42 See also DeRose 1996: esp. 577 – 8. A gentle reminder to the reader: 
nothing said here commits me to any specific theory of assertability. 
I merely record what is obviously true in the present case. 
43 Cohen, 1988: esp. 106 ff. Cohen does not say that this is necessarily 
true. He says only that when the grounds are merely statistical, we 
are “reluctant to attribute knowledge” (106). Strictly speaking, then, 
Cohen need not disagree with anything said here. 
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I respond that manifestly statistical grounds can suffice for 
knowledge. At least sometimes we know that we have lost (will lose) 
the lottery, despite the statistical nature of our grounds. Here I can 
do no better than to quote Hawthorne on the matter: 
[M]any philosophers . . . [seem] to have lost sight of 
certain features of our ordinary practice. Try raising 
the possibility of lottery success to people who are 
planning out their lives. Very often, they will respond 
with ‘You know that’s not going to happen’ or ‘I know 
full well that I’m not going to get that lucky’. Similarly, 
when someone is deliberating about whether to buy a 
lottery ticket, ordinary people will often say ‘You know 
you are wasting your money’. Granted we sometimes 
make knowledge claims using a tone indicating that 
we are not to be taken literally. But I see no good evi-
dence that this is always going on in these cases.44 
Keith DeRose presents another relevant case.45 Suppose someone 
points out that newspapers sometimes transpose a game’s score, 
though this is very, very rare. He then asks me whether the Bulls 
won last night. Newspaper in hand, I consult the sports section, and 
see that it says ‘Knicks 83, at Bulls 87’. I then reason as follows: The 
paper says they won, and the paper almost certainly did not make a 
mistake, so the Bulls won. I thereby come to know that the Bulls 
won, and this despite the fact that my grounds are merely probabil-
 
44 Hawthorne 2004: 18. 
45 DeRose 1996. 
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istic. Everyone knows that newspapers are not perfect, that they 
sometimes make mistakes. And yet we can learn who won last 
night’s game just by checking the paper. Many of us do this quite 
often.46 We rarely explicitly consider the fact that newspapers 
sometimes make mistakes, even as we form beliefs based on what 
we read in them. And it is implausible that being careful enough to 
consider this automatically robs us of our knowledge. 
 
*** 
None of the objections canvassed here withstands scrutiny. I con-
clude that we can have contingent a priori knowledge. The question 




46 DeRose’s case is over a decade old by now. Most people reading 
this paper would probably now get the results by checking a web-
site. An exactly analogous case could be constructed for a website. 
47 For helpful conversation and feedback that helped improve this 
paper, I thank Albert Casullo, Juan Comesaña, Allan Hazlett, Mark 
Huston, Chris Kane, Dan Korman, Sharifa Mohamed, Bruce Russell, 
Joe Shieber, and this journal’s Editor. 
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